Reports and Policy Papers
Fish Wars: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Tanzania. One Earth Future, with Sarah M. Glaser, Colleen Devlin, Ciera Villegas, and Natasia Poinsatte. (PDF)
- Reassessing Private Military and Security Company (PMSC) ‘Competition’ in Civil War: Lessons from Sierra Leone. Small Wars & Insurgencies (2019) - Issue 3, with Christopher Faulkner and Jonathan Powell.
Peeling back the layers on the role of private security companies in Africa. The Conversation, with Christopher Faulkner and Jonathan Powell.
Why Sudan’s deadly crackdown on protestors could escalate in coming weeks. The Conversation, with Eric Keels
Rulers, Elections and Irregular Governance (REIGN) Showcase: Part 1. One Earth Future, with Clayton Besaw and Jean-Pierre Larroque
Projects and Working Papers
Python packages and Data
Security Studies Web Data (sswebdata) Python package to import open-access web data related to conflict, state characteristics, and social phenomena into a pandas data frame.
Psychological Characteristics of Leaders Website for the PsyCL Data set which is a collection of at-a-distance derived cognitive and personality values attained through analysis of over 54 million spoken words.
Them Belly Full but We Hungry: Food Insecurity as an Elite Motivator for Coups
Coup-proofing, Mutinies, and Private Military and Security Companies
with Christopher Faulkner
The logic of delegation suggests that leaders can reduce costs, shift responsibility, and mitigate internal threats to power and stability by investing in forces outside of the regular military such as militias (Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell, 2016). At the same time, leaders may utilize exogenous actors (i.e. private military and security companies-PMSCs) to achieve similar goals, particularly during conflict spells. However, scholars have focused primarily on the role of the former, giving little attention to the determinants of PMSCs’ involvement during conflict. This paper fills this void, arguing that states’ decisions to devolve and/or outsource security is largely a consequence of the historical condition of its civil-military relations. In particular, we suggest that reliance on a state’s coup proclivity as a barometer of its civil-military relations only tells a partial story. Using new data on military mutinies across the African continent from 1950-2018, we explore how states’ propensity for mutinies impact decisions to delegate authority to pro-government militias and to contract PMSCs during intrastate conflict. We argue that mutinies, a signal of discontent within the military, contribute to these decisions to seek out alternative sources of security.